Wolf in Sheep\u27s Clothing by Costa, Michael
sharing assistance to established firms investing in 
targeted export developments—a technique used in 
Sweden, France, Japan and the US— also seems a 
productive approach. Governments need to actively 
seek bilateral and multilateral trading agreements 
and assist in the international marketing of Austral­
ian produced manufactures.
It needs to be emphasised that support for this 
type of industry policy strategy does not necessarily 
imply opposition to a programmed reduction in
tariff protection, or to microeconomic reform in 
areas such as transport and communications. How­
ever, reduction in existing forms of protection such 
as tariffs should be taken as being contingent on the 
introduction of positive industry assistance pack­
ages. What is required is a fundamental renovation 
of the structure of industry assistance, not its demo­
lition. ■ 
NEIL HART teaches in economics at the Univer­
sity of Western Sydney, Macarthur.
WOLF IN 
SHEP'S CLOTMNG
In recent years there has developed within the labour movement a greater appreciation of the role of the market in shaping economic develop 
ment. In line with this greater understanding, it is 
now broadly accepted that tariff protection has not 
helped the development of world class industries. 
The most internationally uncompetitive sectors of 
the Australian economy are, in most cases, also the 
sectors which have been most heavily protected.
The connection between tariff protection—a 
specific form of protection—and internationally 
poor performance has been grudgingly accepted by 
some sections of the labour movement. In general, 
the damaging consequences of protection on eco­
nomic performance have not been fully appreci­
ated—hence the current search for a new form of 
protection to replace the final removal of tariffs at 
the end of this decade.
The search for a new protectionist framework, 
has been dressed up as a search for industry policy. 
What precisely is meant by industry policy is not 
very clear, but it seems to have something to do with 
positive industry assistance initiatives and structural 
adjustment assistance. Presumably it is the govern­
ment that is to provide these assistance measures.
Since these measures will incur costs on the 
community purse, the government will either have 
to increase taxation or draw resources from other 
areas of need to pay for them. Irrespective of how 
these measures are funded, it is clear that govern­
ment provision of assistance to one group must be at 
the expense of another group or activity. The cost 
may well be borne by the more needy in the commu­
nity, who have traditionally been provided for by 
government, and who are unable to afford to fund 
glossy reports and lobbyists to convince government 
of the importance of their special interest. Given the
competing claims on government, the key issue is 
how to choose which claims to meet. It is in this area 
that the latter day protectionists have failed to make 
a convincing case. The advocates of industry policy 
have advanced two major arguments in favour of it. 
These stress:
• the need to export more high value-added prod­
ucts such as elaborately transformed manufactures 
(ETMs). These high value-added industries are 
desirable because of their growing importance in 
world trade and because they provide the platform 
for high value-added input services.
• the need to create and develop industries which 
have a strong ‘linkage relationship’ with other 
industries (such as the car industry). These link­
age relationships generate positive effects across a 
range of activities, including high value-added 
services.
The first argument, that ETMs should be en­
couraged by active industry policy, is not convincing 
because it fails to establish the market failure the 
policy is supposed to correct. Agreement that ETMs 
are desirable is not an argument for active industry 
policy. If these high value-added industries are gen­
erating returns above those to be achieved in sectors 
that are low value-added, one could expect, all 
things being equal, that capital and other resources 
would flow into these sectors.
The fact that Australia runs a trade deficit in 
ETMs is not a sign of market failure. It is a sign that 
some other country is a more efficient producer of 
these items than we are. The desire on the part of 
some special interest groups to encourage the gov­
ernment to increase support for these industries is 
understandable but it should, nevertheless, be re­
jected on economic grounds.
The second argument put forward by advocates
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of interventionist industry policy—the need to cre­
ate strong linkages— is closely associated with the 
view that manufacturing has a special claim on the 
community’s resources. According to this line of 
thought, manufacturing matters because a substan­
tial core of service employment is tightly linked to 
manufacturing. The 'manufacturing matters mud­
dle’ occurs because these alleged linkages are drawn 
too tightly.
For example, it is not correct to claim that 
production inputs must be closely located to up­
stream processing activities. It is quite possible to be 
an up-stream processor of a commodity while being 
relatively under-endowed with raw materials. The 
Japanese have managed todominate many industrial 
sectors, despite relying on imported raw materials. 
Japan’s comparative advantage initially lay in other 
resources such as an abundance of cheap, highly- 
trained and disciplined labour.
The most sophisticated economic arguments for 
interventionist industry policy are based on “strate­
gic trade theories”. Brander, one of the major expo­
nents of strategic trade theories argues that it may be 
possible in certain circumstances to use tariffs and 
other targeted industry assistance measures to in­
crease national welfare. He examines a situation 
where a domestic market is serviced by one foreign 
producer fearful of domestic entry and substitution. 
Here it is possible for an appropriately applied tariff 
to return an economic rent to the domestic govern­
ment, provided that the tariff is pitched at a level 
that enables the foreign firm to absorb it without 
raising prices sufficiently to encourage a domestic 
entrant. The tariff acts as a tax on the foreign 
producer.
By transferring a proportion of the foreign firm’s
potential profits to the state treasury this tariff-cum- 
tax can increase the domestic nation’s economic 
welfare at the expense of the foreign firm. In short, 
under certain circumstances, underlying interna­
tional comparative advantage can be exploited 
through government action.
The views of the strategic trade theorists are 
economically plausible and much more sophisti­
cated than those based on the value-added or link­
ages arguments examined above, because they are 
able to identify the market failure that government 
intervention is supposed to correct. It lies in imper­
fectly competitive international markets or advan­
tages accruing to competitors for particular histori­
cal reasons.
Ironically, the strength of such theories is also 
their major weakness—they only hold true in lim­
ited circumstances and under fairly restrictive as­
sumptions. The major problem with strategic trade 
theory and industrial targeting is to identify the 
sectors that ought to be targeted for special assist­
ance.
The tradition of the labour movement requires 
that policies be formulated to deliver equality of 
opportunity and consideration for those in need. 
Interventionist industry policies are inconsistent 
with that approach on both counts. They are de­
signed to favour one group over another and are 
ultimately funded by the average Australian worker 
either directly through taxation or by way of an 
impost on household consumption. Interventionist 
industry policies are thus anathema to the principles 
of labour, if not its historic practice. I
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■  LEAVING THE
The recent backlash against ‘economic rational­ism’ has challenged our over-reliance on mar­ket forces to accomplish restructuring and the 
subordination of social goals to economic ones. In 
the commonsense of many on the left, tariff reduc­
tions belong in the litany of ‘economic rationalist’ 
sins allegedly committed by the Labor government 
over the 80s, alongside financial deregulation, the 
erosion of universal welfare provision, 
corporatisation, privatisation and, more recently, 
the shift away from centralised wage fixing.
But while the debate about tariffs is part of a
BARRIER
wider debate about the power of the market to 
allocate resources effectively, not all those on the 
side of interventionism are in favour of protection­
ism. The recent debate over Australian industry 
policy was inaugurated by the Australian Manufac­
turing Council’s (AMC) report Gbbal Challenge and 
the Gamaut Report in 1990. In that debate, those 
who argued for government assistance to industry on 
the grounds of market failure and the unlevel char­
acter of the international playing field also generally 
insisted that protectionism was not the best way to 
assist industry and that highly protected industries
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